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Maurizio Lazzarato is an Italian sociologist and philosopher who lives and 
works in France. He collaborated on collective works with important figures like 
Antonio Negri and Yann Moulier-Boutang in the 1990s and has been a frequent 
contributor to the journal Multitudes in which the same two intellectuals were also 
leading voices.  During the same period, he was closely involved as a theorist and 
activist in the long and inventive struggle of the intermittents du spectacle, French 
cultural workers defending a social security regime that took particular account of 
their unstable employment and the way in which their creativity overflowed their 
periods of paid activity. This involvement fed into a broader reflection and 
theorization around mutations of labor, the rise of precariousness, neo-liberal 
governance and leftist mobilization that found expression in a range of texts 
published in the 2000s. Lazzarato came forcefully to public attention in the 
English-speaking world when his timely, important book on debt, La Fabrique de 
l’homme endetté, was translated into English as The Making of the Indebted Man 
in 2013. That book came out of his broader concern with neo-liberal governance 
and the subjectivities associated with it, but it was tightly focused on debt.  The 
two books to be discussed here return to that larger picture, the prime focus of 
Governing by Debt being neo-liberal governance and that of Signs and Machines, 
the production of subjectivity under capitalism. Like La Fabrique, both books are 
in close dialogue with Foucault and particularly his famous analysis of neo-
liberalism in his Birth of Bio-politics Lectures at the Collège de France, an analysis 
which, in one way or another, they seek to update. Again like La Fabrique, both 
are also heavily influenced by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari and make ample 
use of some of the main concepts that they deploy in books like Anti-Oedipus and 
A Thousand Plateaus (e.g. codes, deterritorialization, flows and their capture, 
axioms, assemblages, machines). The denser and more demanding of the two 
works, Signs and Machines, is also particularly indebted to Guattari’s discussion of 
signifying and a-signifying semiotics and draws heavily on theorists like Bakhtin 
and the filmmaker Pasolini while engaging in a sustained critique of key 
contemporary critical theorists like Judith Butler, Jacques Rancière, Alain Badiou 
and, to a lesser extent, Slavoj Žižek.  Collectively, the latter are seen by Lazzarato 
to be part of a more general preoccupation with language, signification and the 
subject, at the expense of a more rounded account of capitalist subjection in its 
machinic and asignifying dimensions. Badiou and Rancière are also criticized for 
neglecting the political dimension of the economic and developing theories of 
politics singularly lacking in any grounded sense of how contemporary capitalism 
produces subjection.  
 
Governance 
Governing by Debt begins in rather unconventional manner with a glossary that 
explains how Lazzarato understands certain key terms, but in fact it feels more like 
a bullet point summary of issues to be developed. The explanation proper starts 
when, in characteristically forthright terms, Lazzarato states his disagreement with 
both orthodox and heterodox economists.  While for both groups, appropriation is 
secondary to production (with production and growth preceding any distribution), 
for Lazzarato appropriation and distribution come first. In other words, it is the 
apparatuses of capture and distribution that define the conditions of production and 
not vice versa. It is for this reason that Lazzarato insists on the political nature of 
the economic:  economic and labor relations are always already political; that is, 
power asymmetries define them from the start so that it is naïve, say, to think of 
liberating labor from capital, because labor, as we now understand it, is not defined 
simply by production but is fundamentally shaped by the broader system of 
appropriation and distribution.  
For Lazzarato, there are three main mechanisms for financial capture and 
distribution. These are profit, rent and taxation and each has worked in different 
ways and in different combinations to ensure capitalist profitability.  In the period 
of post-war growth, for example, a combination of high taxation, including the 
Keynesian “death of the rentier,” and state investment allowed production and the 
ensuing profit to become the main sources of capital increase. But this dominance 
of production and profit was not the natural (capitalist) order of things but rather a 
historically specific arrangement. It depended on a specific concatenation of the 
profit-rent-debt trio rooted in particular power dynamics such as the partial 
independence of financial and industrial capital, the relative independence of the 
state, the power of the workers’ movement and the co-existence of private and 
public ownership (Governing 30).  Now that the state, finance and industry have 
become more deeply imbricated and the workers’ movement no longer serves as 
an effective counter-weight to these forces, any return to something like a Fordist 
compromise, or a new “New Deal,” is no longer possible (39).  
Since the 2008 sub-prime crisis, the same three financial apparatuses have 
been involved, but taxation has risen to the fore as the principle tool for capture 
and distribution. With capitalist valorization through profit and financial rent both 
stalled, and with major corporations sitting on mountains of cash that risked losing 
its power as capital, simply becoming exchange money, taxation had to step in to 
monetize the crisis (35). Taking up the slack left by other mechanisms, taxation 
determines who must pay and where the money must go in a way that ensures the 
wholly political reproduction of the economy. At the same time, as Lazzarato 
explains, taxation takes on the evaluative role that, at other times, was assumed by 
the other apparatuses mentioned above.  During the period when production was 
the main source of profit, labor time was the privileged way to assign value.  After 
the 1960s, when financial capital and rent became dominant, stock market price 
and annual rates of return on investment became the main measures of value. Now 
it is the turn of tax, says Lazzarato, by which I assume he means not simply that 
taxpayers provide the money needed to keep the market and its weighing of 
equivalences functioning, but that the collection and distribution of tax becomes a 
measure of who should pay what and which claims on funding should or should 
not be respected. What is clear, however, is that Lazzarato does not align himself 
with some of those in the Marxist tradition who rather puzzlingly still see labor 
time as the only measure of value.  
Lazzarato’s reading of the current crisis also develops key areas where he 
feels Foucault’s thought needs to be modified. To begin with, he suggests that 
Foucault overestimates liberalism’s opposition to the state.  Following Deleuze and 
Guattari’s lead, he maintains that capitalism has always been state capitalism, and 
has always depended on state, or supra-state sovereignty in one way or another. 
Thus, since 2008 for example, countries like Greece have come under extreme 
pressure from other states and from institutions like the EU, the European Central 
Bank or the International Monetary Fund to ensure that banks and finance are 
saved and the population pays. This is not to say that the state is simply an 
extension of capital.  In its capacity for creative destruction (or anti-production), 
capital is essentially deterritorializing, in the Deleuzo-Guattarian sense of the term. 
Because of its restless flows, and its reduction of all specific values to monetary 
equivalents, it undoes borders and bounded social and cultural identities. The state, 
in contrast, “encodes”: that is, it establishes fixed codes governing territory, 
borders and community.  Because these two logics are fundamentally 
heterogeneous, their coming together can only be the result of a particular and 
historically variable assemblage, the state being essential to capital because of its 
compensatory stabilizations and its disciplinary and governmental powers. Rather 
than seeking to dissolve the state, neo-liberalism has molded it, accelerating its 
subordination to economic logics but also putting its apparatuses to work. 
Competition does not arise spontaneously but needs to be incited and protected by 
laws.  Flexibility is imposed on job markets. Pensions and social spending have to 
be cut and/or privatized.  A tax regime favorable to capitalist rent must be put in 
place. While neo-liberalism brought in an era of intensified deterritorialization (of 
capital, goods, communication and labor) and of the violent decoding (or 
destruction) of the protections, containments and disciplines of Fordism, the state 
was still essential to its functioning, as the current crisis, with its move to post-
democratic, authoritarian governmentality underlines (112).  
Lazzarato also only agrees to an extent with Foucault’s insistence that one 
should engage with different capitalisms and the institutional arrangements and 
contexts conditioning them, rather than talking about capitalism in the singular as 
the outcome of some intrinsic logic of capital. When neo-liberalism frees 
capitalism from Fordist institutions, Lazzarato notes, it does so through the release 
of capital’s destructive, deterritorializing power.  Furthermore, the finance capital 
dominant under neo-liberalism is not simply one type of capital amongst others, 
but is the form, as he puts it, that is closest to capital’s concept. Finance and its 
accounting mechanisms are indifferent to the specific qualities of production or 
labor. They simply need to extract surplus in monetary form, and so come closest 
to expressing capital’s fundamental drive (141).  Furthermore, the credit money of 
finance represents the most deterritorialized form of capital. It is, in Lazzarato’s 
words, “like a ‘flow of financing’ which constitutes the true power and veritable 
‘police’ of capital” (123).  Put differently, credit decides which activities will or 
will not take place, evaluates profitability, and can withdraw approval as a way of 
exercising disciplinary control.  Credit money, finally, is the best expression of 
what one can call the “collective capitalist.”  Independent of any particular activity, 
but able to connect radically disparate sources of profit, whether pre-industrial, 
industrial, or post-industrial, it is where capital comes closest to expressing a 
collective consciousness. So, while neo-liberalism is inevitably conditioned by 
specific contexts and histories, it can only be understood with reference to some of 
the core logics of capital.   
 
Debt 
Where does neo-liberalism’s mobilization of debt fit into this larger picture? As an 
initial approximation, one might say that it confirms Lazzarato’s critique of 
Foucault’s overly sanguine reading of neo-liberalism. If we accept, says Lazzarato, 
that governmentality involves actions upon actions rather than more direct 
compulsion, the neo-liberal variant does not simply incite, solicit and facilitate, as 
per Foucault, but also prohibits, directs, commands and normalizes. This is 
especially in evidence in the American university which, suggests Lazzarato, is a 
model of the debt society.  
Lazzarato notes the sheer size of outstanding US student debt:  it is more 
than half of France or Italy’s public debt in March 2012 and much more than the 
sum for which Greece was savaged by the EU and the IMF (65). He also notes that 
more than one third of the debt is securitized; that is, it is carved up, repackaged 
and sold on, just as the notorious sub-prime mortgages were. The banks are 
apparently still confident that, should things go wrong, they will be protected and 
the costs of default will be borne by the public (67). He also observes that, by 
transferring the cost of education to students, the system frees up money that can 
then be returned to the wealthy and the corporations by the tax system in its 
operation as a device for the capture and distribution of wealth.  
Beyond these initial observations, however, Lazzarato is especially 
interested in the light student debt casts on neo-liberal governance and the 
production of subjectivity. Firstly, he notes that, in the production of knowledge, 
the creditor-debtor relationship has replaced that which bound capitalists and wage 
earners, and suggests that neo-liberalism would like this new form of class relation 
to apply across society. Secondly, he observes how, in contrast to older 
disciplinary mechanisms, the reach of debt is much wider. While industrial 
workers were enclosed in a circumscribed space and were fully aware of their 
enclosure, debt functions across space and is interiorized by the subject. Similarly, 
while the worker was only contained for his or her labor time, debt colonizes the 
time of life, past, present and future.  In particular, it takes hold of the time of 
possibility, shutting down the subject’s chance to effect radical change. When it 
grouped workers together in factories, capitalism created a collective identity for 
those it exploited.  Debt, in contrast, isolates. Debtors stand alone and interiorize 
shame rather than exteriorizing anger and engaging in revolt. Put simply, the 
machinery of debt is the most adequate way to produce homo economicus, the 
domesticated subject who sees him or herself as a miniature enterprise. The  
indebted person is effectively forced to become a calculating machine, seeing 
educational and career choices as good or bad investments that are more or less 
able to pay off the money borrowed.  
Lazzarato’s account of debt puts him clearly at odds with a range of 
mainstream and more oppositional thinkers. In contrast to those who would equate 
market exchange with liberation from traditional social obligations and frame debt 
as merely free exchange extended over time, Lazzarato emphasizes the 
asymmetrical (unequal) power dynamics of the creditor-debtor relationship and the 
necessary open-endedness of debt. Under financial capitalism, he suggests, any 
general exit from debt would in fact spell the end of capitalism itself, given the 
centrality of the credit-debt nexus to the system. Lazzarato also stresses his 
disagreement with French regulation theory economists like Michel Aglietta or 
André Orléan. He gives the latter credit for linking the emergence of money to 
debt rather than market exchange as in mainstream accounts, but then criticizes 
them for resorting to an ahistorical account of primordial debt within which one is 
always indebted to the gods, the state or society.  In contrast to this naturalization 
of debt, and taking inspiration from Nietzsche and Deleuze and Guattari, Lazzarato 
stresses the specific power dynamics and historical roots of modern debt.  He 
suggests that debt was in fact finite and mobile (shifting between members of a 
group) in archaic societies, and that infinite debt, far from being a universal, was a 
product of the emergence of imperial states and monotheisms.  It was then left to 
capitalism to take it forward and to mobilize the no less infinite guilt that 
monotheistic religions associate with it. This account of the emergence of 
capitalist debt is also turned against David Graeber’s monumental work, Debt: the 
First Five Thousand Years.  Lazzarato gives Graeber credit for underscoring the 
difference between credit money and commodity or exchange money but suggests 
that Graeber’s long-term account of cycles when one or other money form 
dominates dissolves any sense of the historical specificity of the capitalist 
deployment of debt.  
Outside of the way he takes issue with certain theorists, and his particular 
focus on US universities, Lazzarato’s discussion of debt here essentially condenses 
what is lain out at greater length in his earlier book, The Making of the Indebted 
Man. What Governing by Debt adds to his that work is, firstly, a contextualization 
of debt within a wider account of neo-liberal governance and, secondly, a 
discussion of the machinic dimension of capitalist subjection that is developed at 
greater length and in combination with the semiotic in Signs and Machines.  
 
Machinic Capitalism and Semiosis 
Machines, Lazzarato notes drily, are everywhere except in critical theory 
(Governing 23).  Capitalism, he adds, is machinocentric not logocentric (25).  By 
this he does not simply mean that, having once been localized within factories, 
electronic/mechanical technical machines are now omnipresent. His concept of the 
machine is broader than that. For him, as for Deleuze and Guattari, the machinic 
implies the co-imbrication of human elements, technical machines, material spaces 
and objects and semiotic processes.  A machine never simply consists of technical 
machinery but is the outcome of any functional assemblage of interdependent 
elements.  
Semiosis, in Lazzarato’s tri-partite, Guattari-inspired scheme, involves 
symbolic, signifying and asignifying semiotics. Described by Lazzarato in the 
context of archaic societies, symbolic semiotics includes gestural, ritual, corporeal, 
musical and other elements. Signifying semiotics is linguistic.  Asignifying 
semiotics includes things like stock listings, currencies, corporate accounting, 
budgets, computer languages, mathematics, scientific functions and equations. 
Because it involves more abstract modes of semiotization than language, it “slips 
by” our minds without producing significations or representations. Typically, it 
manifests itself in the sciences, industrial corporations or the stock market rather 
than in the world of civil society or political representation (55-80).  
The symbolic semiotic forms of archaic societies are non-hierarchical. 
They co-exist with each other without any one kind providing a higher unity and 
thus allow for a plurality of realities. Their subordination to the signifying 
semiotics of language is essential for capitalism. Language splits reality from 
representation, rendering the former singular. Just as importantly, language 
abstracts enunciation (semiotic production) from its collective, existential context 
and attributes it to individuals (I, you etc.), this separation being necessary both to 
ground property relationships, and to attribute the coded, differentiated roles 
(man/woman, boss/worker) necessary to the functioning of the capitalist economy.  
But language is too territorialized and too cognitive to connect to the burgeoning 
multiplicity of machinic processes involved in contemporary capitalism. Here, the 
asignifying semiotics of finance, of computers etc., with its more abstract, more 
deterritorialized forms, comes into its own. For capitalism to function, not as any 
specific machinic assemblage but as an assemblage of assemblages (social, 
communicational, productive, financial, etc.), it has to be able to organize, connect, 
evaluate and capture a heterogeneous multiplicity of processes. Within this 
framework, not all asignifying semiotics are equally powerful. While a chemical 
formula or an organization chart, say, can shape production, it is financial capital, 
precisely because of its greater deterritorialization (its ability to evaluate and 
capture a disparate multiplicity of processes with the aid of computers, money, 
markets etc.), that reigns (Governing 189-93; Signs 39-42, 83-8).  
We can flesh out this powerful but general account by seeing how it applies 
to specific cases. We might note how the factory, for example, can be seen not 
simply as a place where technical machines are housed, but as itself a productive 
machine that only works through the combination (the assemblage) of a particular 
set of social arrangements, economic practices, flows (of raw materials, power, 
goods, etc.), human activity and technical machinery.  If the factory needs subjects 
(individuals associated with particular roles and positions in the hierarchy, deemed 
worthy of particular rewards), it also needs human cogs (that is sub-individual or 
de-individualized human movements, gestures, behaviors, that enter into 
interaction with mechanical cogs to create a productive apparatus). At the same 
time, the factory is a place of semiosis. Clearly, because its machinery involves 
human interaction, linguistic interchange or signifying semiotics, in Lazzarato’s 
terminology, is necessary. But, because production also responds to charts, plans, 
diagrams, statistics, blue-prints, programs and so on, another kind of semiotics, of 
an asignifying nature, is also involved (Signs 113-7).  
Taking a more obviously contemporary case, we could look at Lazzarato’s 
analysis of the stock-exchange and the trader’s machinic subjectivity. To begin 
with, he notes how the trading room contains data, curves or “diagrams” traced by 
a worldwide computer network, “diagrams” being a particular type of “power” 
sign that mimics elements of the shape of some phenomenon (in this case company 
prices) and acts upon it (by, for example, channeling investment).  Within this 
context, the trader’s subjectivity establishes what Lazzarato calls “focal points of 
proto-enunciation” (96).  Bidding prices up or down, anticipating profitability, 
components of subjectivity (memory, understanding, attention, perception) 
combine with the machinic proto-subjectivity expressed in curves and data to form 
enunciations. The human subjectivity involved has no choice but to rely on 
technical machines, asignifying data and information codified by mathematical 
instruments. Likewise, when the trader expresses the mood of interest groups such 
as political parties, lobbies or economic interests, he or she can only do so because 
he or she is connected to all the apparatus of modern communication. The product 
of complex assemblages, the trader’s moods and enunciations are in no way a 
simple expression of the human individual or, indeed, of human cognition. Yet, at 
the same time, the discourse of economists, media, experts and judges make us 
believe that it is indeed the individual who acts and therefore must be compensated 
or punished. The semiotics of signification thus allows for the generation of 
stories, information and commentary which legitimate the role and the reward of 
these individuated subjects in the eyes of the public (96-100).  
The example of the trader or the factory worker illustrates well the dual 
nature of subjection under capitalism. On the one hand, people are positioned, 
especially by language, in individual roles because capital needs them to occupy 
specific social or occupational places. On the other, people (their gestures, moods, 
attention, preferences, tastes and so on) are disassembled and put to work in larger 
ensembles by what Lazzarato calls machinic enslavement. This does not mean that 
people are sometimes self-contained individuals and sometimes disaggregated 
parts. It simply means that they are treated differently by two types of machinic 
assemblage: one type, involving signifying semiotics, encodes and individualizes; 
another, involving asignifying semiotics, decodes and deterritorializes. Within the 
former, with its binary logics, humans relate to machines as subjects to objects. 
Within the latter, in contrast, fusion takes place and human “parts” are simply cogs 
of the hybridized, human-technical machine.  So, when we pick up our cell phones, 
we are addressed by signifying semiotics as fetishized, consumerist subjects even 
as machinic enslavement disaggregates elements of our subjectivity, electronically 
reassembles them with those of others, and sells them on to advertisers as data.    
What light does all this throw on the functioning of debt? We have already 
seen how debt needs to produce bounded individuals, indentured entrepreneurs of 
the self, who can be held to account, feel guilt and take responsibility for what they 
owe. But we can now also appreciate how the subject status accorded to 
individuals has no place once they are processed as data and figures by the 
financial machine.  In Lazzarato’s own words:   
[T]he credit/debt incorporated into the assemblage loses all 
reference to the subject who contracted the debt. Credit/debt is 
literally torn to pieces (in the same way the assemblage tears the 
subject to pieces) by the financial machine, which the subprime 
crisis has shown all too well.  It is no longer a matter of this or 
that investment, of this or that debt: the financial assemblage has 
transformed the subject into a currency that acts as “capital,” as 
money that generates money.” (48).  
With debt, as in other areas, subjection requires individualized subjects and 
machinic cogs. Under neo-liberalism, Lazzarato notes, both forms of subjection 
have been put more intensely to work: we are more individualized yet more 
exposed to machinic enslavement. 
  
The Failings of Critique 
This highly persuasive account of the dual nature of capitalist subjection 
goes a long way in explaining Lazzarato’s argument that other analyses of the 
contemporary period and other leading critical thinkers simply fail to get to grip 
with the object under study.  In the case of “cognitive capitalism,” for example, the 
linguistic, cognitive and representational dimensions of capitalism are privileged in 
a way that suggests that the knowledge held by individuals or groups can open up 
liberatory possibilities.  However, as Lazzarato rather drily notes, far from 
unleashing creativity, so-called cognitive capitalism saturates public space with 
ignorance and subjective impoverishment.  It destroys knowledge, cultures and 
understandings that are not beholden to capitalist logics even as it opens education, 
research, culture and art to privatization, competition, profitability and corporate 
commercialism.  In this context, a Marxist account that separated the knowledge 
and creativity of living human labor from the dead labor of machinery, systems or 
spaces would entirely miss the point:  to the extent that human labor is constructed 
by both the machinery of subjectivation and machinic enslavement, it is naïve to 
think that its creativity or knowledge could somehow be liberated or desert (Signs  
120).  In any case, Lazzarato notes, any specific focus on cognitive or cultural 
capitalism distracts from the broader power and knowledge relations that mold the 
subjectivities of the population as a whole (221-2).   
Lazzarato criticizes both Badiou and Rancière for their narrowly political 
framing of the political and their consequent neglect of the politics of the economic 
and in particular the machinic dimension of contemporary capitalism.  Unless we 
understand subjection more adequately, he maintains, we are ill-placed to think 
what form a break with capitalism’s hold on subjectivity might take (13). Rancière 
is more specifically taken to task for the centrality he gives to language and the 
equality of speaking subjects in his understanding of politics and the emergence of 
oppositional subjectivities. This is mistaken, says Lazzarato, because subjective 
mutation is not primarily discursive but comes from much deeper, in the existential 
relationship to the self, others and the world (16).  
The existential is a difficult, elusive term in this context. We can perhaps 
get closer to it if we look at Lazzarato’s critique of Butler. Drawing on Bakhtin 
and Guattari, Lazzarato takes issue with Butler’s mobilization of the performative, 
notably as she uses it to account for the force of Rosa Park’s famous refusal to give 
up her seat to a white man. Firstly, he sees no reason why the performative should 
be accorded a privileged role when one examines the political force of speech acts: 
any speech act, he suggests, involves a self-positioning because it is dialogic in a 
Bakhtinian sense. It arises in a situation where there are always plural voices and, 
not simply tied to the moment, it must locate itself in relation to preceding 
utterances and anticipate possible responses.  Nor is enunciation a purely 
discursive phenomenon: apart from gestures, postures, tone or facial expression, it 
also involves, as Bakhtin notes, an affective and social evaluation of the situation 
and a felt awareness of how speech positions the speaker (187-190). This sense of 
a complex, contextual self-positioning takes us closer to what Lazzarato means 
when he evokes Guattari’s existential pragmatics. Yet for the latter, the existential 
unsurprisingly has a machinic dimension and is characterized by “a logic of 
intensities and affects established prior to the distinction of identities, persons and 
functions” (208). The question which then arises is whether, creating new 
assemblages, this existential refusal can reconfigure the relation with existing 
discursive, cognitive, social and economic forms in a durable way.   
Despite the difficulty one might feel grasping this thought, there is a clear 
consistency to it. Subjection and revolt are thought within the same frame and 
using the same terms so that one can understand their potential articulation. 
Because the former works linguistically and non-linguistically, through subjects 
and through machines, it is important to approach the latter in the same way. 
Moreover, if we accept that subjection involves assemblages, rather than rigid 
structures, then we can also see how emergent oppositional subjects might seek to 
create new assemblages. 
 
The Current Impasse 
While Lazzarato is clear about the overwhelming domination currently 
exercised by neo-liberalism, he is convinced that capitalism is in crisis. His 
understanding of this crisis does not rely on the usual suspects of debt bubbles, 
diminishing rates of return or environmental exhaustion, as real as these things 
may be. Instead, he sees it as primarily one of subjectivity or, rather, of the 
articulation of economic, technological, and social flows with the production of 
subjectivity (Signs 7-10, Governing 14). Under Fordism, there was a 
complementarity of the worker-consumer and productive and social arrangements. 
Neo-liberalism sought to replace the Fordist worker with the self-realizing 
entrepreneur-of-the-self.  But since the sub-prime crisis, this project has collapsed 
(Governing 14).  Positive entrepreneurial, creative or cognitive figures have been 
abandoned for the majority and debt, its modes of subjection, and the figure of the 
indebted man (sic) have come to dominate. The subjective economy of capitalism, 
an intrinsic part of its hybrid assemblages, rather than something merely 
“superstructural,” is not working. Yet, at the same time, new political experiments 
such as the Occupy movement have been unable to develop alternative modes of 
“macropolitical, reproducible, and generalizable subjectivation” (Signs 21). This is 
why Lazzarato considers that the task he sets himself of developing new 
theoretical tools with which to understand the conditions of political subjectivation 
is an urgent one.  
In part, surely, because of his experience with the French intermittents, or 
his response to the uprising in some French suburbs in 2005 (Signs 169-200), 
Lazzarato is drawn to the strike, riot and revolt as sites where new subjectivations 
can arise.  In particular, he seeks to build on the lessons of the classic workers’ 
strike and how it not only blocked the valorization of capital but also generated 
equality by releasing workers from the division of labor.  He is of course aware 
that, colonizing the leisure time won by workers’ earlier struggles, contemporary 
capitalism exploits leisure, communication, consumption and not simply 
production. Striking, or lazy action as Lazzarato calls it, now means blocking the 
general mobilization decreed by capital by refusing to work as a consumer, 
communicator, user or unemployed person. Suspending identities tied to capitalist 
production but also to the social / gendered division of labor, lazy action opens the 
time both for the collective production, organization and recomposition of 
subjectivities and for the intense work on the self required for a radical change of 
perspective (Governing 245-55).  
One of the things that Lazzarato takes Rancière to task for is his neglect, in 
his conceptualization of politics, of the ethical and the need for work on the self to 
resist capitalist mobilization of subjectivity or the state exercise of bio-power 
(Signs 246). The latter concept, of course, takes us back to Foucault. Lazzarato 
underscores the latter’s use of parrhesia and of the Greek Cynics when he 
develops a sense of what an ethical commitment might mean. Parrhesia is a free or 
bold speech. It involves not simply a claim to equality as a speaking subject (as in 
Rancière) but also the taking of a stand in support of a truth, a positioning of the 
self that sets one in opposition to others and involves risk. This is where the Cynics 
come in. Known for their defacement of the nomos, the laws, customs and 
conventions of society, they had little interest in creating a common “stage” on 
which to make claims to equality (as is the case in Rancière), but were instead  
focused on developing new, better forms of life through their own practices and 
behaviors, even if that meant shamelessness and impudence. Although Lazzarato 
does not explicitly do so, it is perhaps useful to bring the strike, parrhesia and the 
cynics together. It is surely only by refusing to work for capitalism in all spheres of 
life that one can create the time to explore new modes of life even at the risk of 
taking a stand and causing outrage.  
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